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Abstract
This paper aims to examine the difference in effectiveness on development of least developed
countries (LDCs) such as Uganda that opposing trade positions have. Specifically, the paper will
look at development state economic policies versus neoliberal policies in both regional and
global trade to determine how they both effect development as defined by the Human
Development Paradigm and the Neoliberal (Economic) Paradigm.
Research for this paper came from a practicum-based internship with Southern and Eastern
Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute Uganda (SEATINI). The internship
provided guidance for independent research and allowed for participant observation.
Information was also gathered through interviews with various organizations and government
ministries.
This paper found that development state-led economic policies in global trade benefit LDCs such
as Uganda most as it prevents exploitation of their markets by developed economies and
promotes inclusive growth rather than exacerbating wealth inequality. However, in regional
trade free market policies work best as the East African region stands to gain as a whole.
Currently, East Africa’s intra-regional trade is weak and everyone stands to benefit from
increased trade. Furthermore, exploitation of markets will not occur due to countries being of
similar economic size (excluding Egypt and South Africa) and limitations on productive
capacity. To reach the full potential of these policies, however, will require strong capacity
building in both negotiating and trading. This will require a return to the outstanding issues of
the Doha Development Agenda in negotiations at the WTO. Ultimately, the paper finds the
Africa rising narrative to be true if strong policy and good governance is attained.
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1.0

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to analyze developmental state-based policies in trade (defined as
state-led macroeconomic planning) versus the current neoliberal trade position that Uganda
currently employs and what the difference in effectiveness would be in achieving rapid
development, viewed both through the Neoliberal Paradigm and the Human Development
Paradigm. Other objectives to this paper include understanding how LDCs such as Uganda can
expand their trade and negotiation capacity. Lastly, the paper will measure the ability of Uganda
to implement and enforce their trade policies.
To accomplish these objectives, the researcher interned with the Southern and Eastern Africa
Trade Information and Negotiations Institute Uganda (SEATINI) as a trade policy analyst in
Kampala, Uganda. The organization was created to help underdeveloped and developing
economies in East Africa understand multi-lateral trade agreements and help these marginalized
economies negotiate. The governments of least-developed countries (LDCs) have limited
capacity to negotiate and thus SEATINI engages third-world negotiators and helps them
understand trade agreements (global and regional), while also developing alternative policies to
help LDCs. Since 1996, they have also been on the official negotiation delegation of Uganda,
negotiating with the WTO, EPA and UNCTAD.
SEATINI is strongly against the neoliberal paradigm and free-market economics, believing that
it harms LDCs’ industries and allows larger economies to exploit their markets such as what
happened with neoliberal structural adjustment programs, which collapsed many industries in
Africa. Instead, they are for a state-led economy. They believe that the state has a bigger role to
play in development and that while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is important, there is also a
need for state-owned enterprises as well.
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It is important to note that while SEATINI is anti-neoliberal in the context of global trade they
also see the benefits of the free market between countries of equal economic size. This is why
they are pushing for a free trade area between the East African countries and some COMESA
countries.
At SEATINI the researcher conducted analysis of regional trade agreements and WTO
negotiations, writing policy briefs on the research completed. The researcher also prepared a
paper on lessons learned from Singapore’s history as a developmental state. This entailed sifting
through legal texts, reports from organizations such as the EU and WTO, and talking with
individuals formerly involved in these negotiations and agreements.
Other information for this paper was gathered through interviews conducted at various
organizations and government ministries. Although difficult to obtain, these interviews gave
perspectives on trade policy from each key stakeholder group.

2.0

Background

As Uganda looks to become an industry-based middle-income economy by 2020, they must
tackle the question of how to best structure their trade position to achieve rapid development.
This requires protecting their industries without losing access to markets or sacrificing industry
growth. Due to the government’s focus on economic growth as the first priority, they must also
be careful not to sacrifice human development through the weakening of public participation in
decision-making, failing to empower the marginalized and ignoring indicators such as life
expectancy, education levels, literacy, health care and food security.
Currently, the government and civil society lack the expertise and capacity to build and negotiate
a trade position that will help them rapidly develop. Ultimately, this is due to unbalanced power
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dynamics within the WTO and other international organizations. The result of this has been that
Uganda has implemented liberalized trade policies against their national interests causing
domestic markets to be heavily exploited by developed countries, leading to a huge trade deficit
of over $4bn.
On the other hand, within the EAC countries, Uganda is working away from protectionist trade
policies towards a common free market in the region as a means towards inclusive growth and
development. While there are many roadblocks ahead, especially in the area of implementation,
the implications of this position could be huge.
To analyze the effect of these policies on development, the Human Development Paradigm and
Neoliberal Paradigm will be employed. Under the Human Development Paradigm development
is measured by indicators of health, education and income, ensuring that quality of life is used as
the main gage of development. Under the Neoliberal Paradigm development is seen in terms of
economic power and size and thus is measured by GDP.

3.0

Justification

While the World Trade Organization and other international administrative organizations are
superficially equal through a requirement of total consensus, the reality is that undeveloped and
developing economies lack any ability to push their own national development priorities.
Through coercion, developed economies can ignore the interests of smaller economies by
utilizing their positions on the UN Security Council and as international donors. Therefore, it is
important that Uganda develops and negotiates a trade position that will further their national
development agenda in both economic growth and human development while maintaining good
relationships with the developed economies or being able to withstand the penalty of working
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against the interests of larger economies. This is why I’ll be working with SEATINI, who hopes
this will be achieved through building and negotiating a trade position that is inclusive of civil
society and promotes a state-led economy that protects industries without suppressing trade and
foreign direct investment.
Furthermore, it is important to look at the difference between regional trade policies and global
trade policies to understand the difference in effectiveness of ideological trade positions based on
where they are implemented. While neoliberal policies may hurt LDCs on a global level, they
can be vastly beneficial on the regional level. Understanding this difference will help to create
and implement more well-informed and pragmatic policy that is less based on ideology.

4.0

Objectives

The objective of this study is:
•

To learn how Uganda can develop and negotiate a trade position (both globally and
regionally) that will achieve rapid economic growth to accommodate Uganda’s shift to an
industry-based middle-income country while also protecting and furthering human
development priorities. The study will analyze the effectiveness of developmental statebased trade policies in helping small economies achieve rapid economic growth. It will
also look at the ability of these policies to promote human development.

Secondary objectives are:
•

To assess how free-market values benefit Uganda in regional trade.

•

To understand how LDCs such as Uganda can expand their trade and negotiation
capacity
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Through an internship with SEATINI Uganda, these objectives were accomplished.
Furthermore, the organization gained a better understanding of developmental state economics
through the example of Singapore, whose economic history was analyzed by the researcher to
provide lessons for the case of Uganda. SEATINI also benefitted from an analysis conducted on
the WTO’s future priorities for the next Ministerial Conference based on their public forum this
year and how Uganda should respond. Lastly, the organization gained an in-depth analysis on
the Tripartite Free Trade Area in its current state and therefore the potential effects of regional
neoliberalism.

5.0

Methodology

5.1

Research Approach

To conduct this study, the researcher interned as a trade policy analyst for SEATINI Uganda.
SEATINI Uganda’s mission is to build negotiation and trade capacity for East African LDCs
such as Uganda, who otherwise lack the capability to negotiate global trade agreements
beneficial to their national development interests. SEATINI engages third-world negotiators and
helps them understand trade agreements (global and regional), while also developing alternative
policies to help LDCs. The organization’s activities involve creating policy briefs for
government review and dispersing information to civil society and key stakeholders. The intent
of the practicum was to analyze the various trade agreements and negotiations that Uganda is
currently involved in and understand the effects it will have on national development.
SEATINI is strongly against the neoliberal paradigm for global trade, believing that it allows the
markets and industries of LDCs such as Uganda to be exploited by developed economies.
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Instead, SEATINI advocates for state-led global trade policies with the state playing a hands-on
role in the economy and protecting certain industries.
SEATINI has members on the Inter-Institutional Trade Committee (IITC) and in the Ministry of
Trade that creates the national trade positions for negotiations. Since 1996, they have also been
on the official negotiation delegation of Uganda, negotiating with the WTO, EPA and UNCTAD.

5.2

Data Collection Methods

Although this study was practicum-based, a few different methods were used to collect data for
this research in order to get a full understanding of trade policies and its effect on development
such as participant observation, independent research, and interviews. By working with
experienced organization members who have participated in international and regional trade
negotiations and trade position development, the researcher gained a thorough understanding of
the process on trade position development and negotiation capacity building. The internship
provided guidance through numerous assignments, involving both qualitative and quantitative
research, focusing on trade development and capacity building. Through participant observation,
the researcher gained multiple perspectives on trade policy from the viewpoints of the
agricultural, industrial and private sector.
During the 5-week long internship at SEATINI, the method most commonly employed was
independent research. Most research was conducted through online exploration, particularly on
the websites of the World Trade Organization, Ugandan Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Cooperatives, TRALAC, and TradeMark East Africa. This research method gave insights into
the different perspectives of varying organizations and stakeholders on global and East African
regional trade. It provided general background information on the current state of negotiations
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for varying deals and agreements. It also gave direct access to legal texts on the agreements
being analyzed. Through independent research, an understanding of current trade policy and its
historical implications were gained.
Another method that was used were interviews. A total of six interviews were conducted with
various organizations. These organizations were Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU),
Uganda Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UCCI), Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Cooperatives, Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA), Uganda Manufacturers’
Association (UMA) and Uganda Export Promotion Board (UEPB). These interviews
represented the varying viewpoints of different stakeholders from manufacturers to the
government to the private sector. Through this method, the benefits and costs of different trade
positions were analyzed and better understood. The information gained was useful for
understanding the effects of different trade positions on different sectors of society and helped to
reveal the disparity in interests between varying stakeholders. Furthermore, interviews with
government ministries helped to gain a better understanding of how trade positions are
developed, implemented and enforced and where they fall short.

5.3

Limitations

During this practicum-based research, there were many limitations in the methodology used.
While online research provided access to numerous viewpoints, articles alone did not provide
enough information to accomplish many of this paper’s objectives. This independent research
was limited to a few official or assured sources with the vast majority of online articles not being
reliable. Even articles and papers from official sources such as the WTO website were heavily
biased and failed to provide a wholesome picture. Ultimately, these online articles provided only
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background information and limited scopes of different issues while lacking any ability to
observe or understand the reality of the situation on the ground-level.
Participant observation allowed for on-the-ground observation of how trade policy is negotiated
and its capacity expanded. However, due to the nature of the office work, interactions among
colleagues were limited. Due to the language barrier it was also hard to understand when
colleagues made informational remarks. Ultimately, while it gave a better picture of the reality
of on-the-ground trade policy work, participant observation was severely limited in its scope of
knowledge due to colleagues only representing one set of opinions under the organization.
The interview method had the most limitations and issues arise. While the interviews provided
differing viewpoints from varying key stakeholders, logistical issues prevented the interviews
from reaching their full potential. Scheduling interviews often required just showing up to the
organization and speaking with whomever was available due to frequent failure to schedule
interviews with specific members through email and phone. The result of this was that often the
interviewees were not prepared for the questions and thus had to give brief answers occasionally.
Furthermore, interviews often had to be rushed or shortened due to a lack of time. Lastly, the
interviews often gave clashing information, making it hard to determine the truth.

5.4

Ethics

To maintain ethical integrity some precautions were taken. The research gathered during the
practicum came mostly from independent research and personal observation. The integrity and
truthfulness of the findings of this research is of the utmost importance in this paper.
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This study required six interviews to be conducted. These were managed in a confidential
manner unless otherwise preferred by the interviewee. All interviewees received a consent form
to sign guaranteeing them privacy, confidentiality and anonymity if selected.

6.0

Research Findings

6.1

The Case for Developmental State-Based Policies in Global Trade

This paper argues that developmental state-based policies in global trade are better for LDCs
such as Uganda in both economic and human development rather than neoliberal policies such as
the ones Uganda currently employs. To understand the potential of developmental state-based
policies, the example of Singapore’s economic history is examined and lessons for Uganda’s
development is extracted:
The small, island nation of Singapore began its development 51 years ago. With no natural
resources, a dearth of land and a small, uneducated population, it seemed like the country would
never prosper. Yet, today Singapore boasts one of the highest GDP per capita in the world with
a very high quality of life. This section seeks to understand the economic, geographic and
political factors of Singapore’s success and the consequences of its development.
Before looking into the economic and social policies that Singapore was built off of, it is
important to recognize the geographic and historical factors that lead to these policies. In 1965,
when Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia, its prospects looked grim. It had no natural
resources with only 580 square kilometers of land (and even less during high-tide). The country
was underdeveloped with no industry and had a population of recent immigrants with little
shared history or bonds. Furthermore, unemployment was close to 9% and Singapore depended
heavily on the outside world for energy, food and even drinking water. Even the future father of
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the nation, Lee Kuan Yew, commented in 1957 on these glaring issues that an independent
Singapore would be a “political, economic, and geographical absurdity.”
From Singapore’s inception, there was strife. Independence from Malaysia meant the loss of a
common market. The Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation from 1962-1966, cut off Singapore
from its Southern hinterland, damaging the country’s role as a trading port for the region. In
1968, the British government withdrew its troops from Singapore, leaving a fifth of the economy
vulnerable as thousands of workers became jobless overnight (Menon).
Despite all of these factors, Singapore had a strategic trade location and was a natural harbor.
Located at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, almost 40% of world maritime trade passes through
the area (Economist, 2016). Also, because of Singapore’s problems of underdevelopment, lack
of self-sustainability and grim prospects, Singapore gained two clear objectives. First, the
nation’s survival was of the utmost importance, even at the expense of civil liberties. The second
objective was to create a better quality of life for the people through strong economic policies.
While natural factors and good economic policies helped build Singapore into the nation it is
today, the role of strong leadership cannot be overemphasized in Singapore’s process of
development. Under the leadership and guidance of Lee Kuan Yew, the first prime minister and
father of Singapore, the country went from a series of small villages to the thriving economic
powerhouse it is today. In 1959, he was the Prime Minister, when Singapore won selfgovernment from Britain. Under Lee Kuan Yew’s regime of honest and pragmatic governance,
the country prospered. He welcomed foreign trade and investment, and multinational
corporations found the country to be a natural hub that encouraged their expansion (Economist,
2015). In 1990, Lee Kuan Yew retired, but his influence and guidance under pragmatic
capitalism, continues to shape government policy today.
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Singapore’s economic policies and government structure were effective at achieving rapid
economic and human development (measured by the Human Development Index). The
government was kept lean, honest and efficient; qualities not found in most of Singapore’s
neighboring countries. During Singapore’s early years, two strategic economic decisions were
made, against the conventional economic wisdom of the time. The first decision was to shift
away from import-substitution industrialization towards export-led industrialization. Importsubstitution industrialization is a very protectionist trade and economic policy that advocates the
replacement of foreign imports with domestic production. It was very popular during the period
of decolonization, especially among South American countries, for its anti-globalization/antiimperialism ideology. Export-led industrialization, on the other hand, is a trade and economic
policy that aims to accelerate a country’s industrialization process by exporting goods that the
nation has a comparative advantage for. Rather than protecting all domestic industries, this
strategy implies opening markets to foreign competition in exchange for market access in other
countries. However, this doesn’t mean all domestic markets are open as the state wants to
protect and cultivate specific nascent industries, to benefit from a future comparative advantage.
Even export industries may be supported through subsidies. Under export-led industrialization,
countries hope to gain enough hard currency to import commodities that are manufactured more
cheaply elsewhere. The second strategy undertaken was to attract global multinational
corporations to use as drivers of industrial growth. Thus, Singapore regularly tops ease of doing
business surveys.
These two strategic decisions proved well for Singapore. By promoting foreign direct
investments and exports, during a time when most countries were not, Singapore had a decisive
advantage. But, to realize this advantage, the government had to take a more hands-on approach
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in the economy. The state developed infrastructure facilities and industrial land, invested in
basic education with strong emphasis on technical skills relevant to industrialization, and
reformed labor laws to promote industrial peace. Their sound fiscal and monetary policies
fortified investor confidence and guaranteed macroeconomic stability. By 1975, an extensive
industrial base had been established as manufacturing’s share in GDP rose from 14% in 1965 to
22%.
With the economy at full employment, it was time for Singapore to move up the value chain into
more capital-intensive and skill-intensive activities. In the 1960s, factories produced items such
as matches, fish hooks and mosquito coils. By the 1970s, these labor-intensive industries
steadily declined as petrochemicals, electronics, component and precision engineering emerged.
The compositional change of manufacturing was rapid as Singapore became the leading producer
of hard disk drives globally by the 1980s.
From 1960-1985, Singapore had its economic “take-off” phase. The economic essentials of
prudent public finances, co-operative industrial relations, sound monetary policies, outward
orientation and market-based strategies became rooted in Singapore’s ideology, governance and
culture. By 1985, the economy had grown 10% per annum as Singapore emerged at the forefront
of developing countries as a newly-industrialized economy.
In 1985, Singapore went into an economic recession; the only time in its history where the
domestic economy contracted while the global economy grew. The recession revealed structural
tensions that had been hidden by strong economic growth. These tensions included resource
constraints and diminishing returns to investment, thus weakening Singapore’s cost advantage as
its initial period of growth came to an end. As a result, structural reforms were enacted such as
improved wage flexibility in the labor market, faster industrial upgrading, the promotion of
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innovation, enterprise and entrepreneurship, further entry into regional markets for trade and
outward investments, and the liberalization of various service sectors such as finance,
telecommunications and utilities (Menon).
The modern oasis of Singapore would still be a series of small, poor villages today without its
natural geographic factors, strong leadership and effective developmental economic policies.
Singapore is a rags-to-riches story that highlights what a nation can do under developmental state
economics.
Based on this economic history of Singapore, LDCs can gain a few lessons (especially Uganda,
who shares many similarities with the small island nation):
1. Like Singapore 50-years ago, Uganda is an underdeveloped country with limited industry
development and a divided population with little shared history or bonds.
Unemployment is high and Uganda relies heavily on the outside world for food security.
Despite all of these factors, Uganda has a strategic trade location as a transit point from
the coast to the hinterlands of East Africa, sharing a border with five countries. Because
of this similarity in background to Singapore, Uganda should have a clear objective:
Creating a better quality of life for the people through strong economic policies.
2. Uganda needs strong leadership to guide the nation towards economic prosperity. It
requires an honest, pragmatic and hands-on government.
3. Pragmatic Capitalism: Uganda should welcome state-selected foreign trade and
investment. Multinational corporations could find Uganda to be a good entry point into
African market expansion. Uganda could benefit from this dynamic if the right capital
control policies are implemented to limit capital repatriation. These control policies may
not be direct but in the form of labor quotas in which most labor must be Ugandan.
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4. Government restructuring: The government needs to be kept lean, honest and efficient.
This requires tough laws on corruption, a downsize in civil service, reduced bureaucracy,
and the halt of the creation of more districts.
5. Export-led Industrialization: Import-substitution industrialization where foreign imports
and replaced with domestic production ultimately leads to higher prices, decreased trade
and economic growth and thus isn’t a model to be considered by Uganda. Export-led
industrialization, on the other hand, is a trade and economic policy that aims to accelerate
a country’s industrialization process by exporting goods that the nation has a comparative
advantage for and protecting nascent industries with a future comparative advantage.
Uganda should undertake export-led industrialization, focusing on the
products/commodities that it has a comparative advantage for (in the region) and
cultivating/protecting nascent industries with future comparative advantage potential.
This requires improving ease of doing business in the country.
6. The state needs to invest in infrastructure development, industrial land and basic
education (that emphasizes technical skills) to promote industrialization as a driver for
economic growth.
7. Fiscal and monetary policies must be sound to fortify investor confidence and guarantee
macroeconomic stability
8. Uganda should focus on developing its financial services to promote innovation and
increase financing/support of industry.
The lessons and implications from Singapore’s example are clear and the potential benefits are
huge. However, while developmental state policies are evidently beneficial on the national
economic level and human development level, it is important to view the potential effects on
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specific economic stakeholders. Specifically, this paper will look at the effects it has on
manufacturers, exporters, and those in the private sector.
Representing manufacturers, an economic policy analyst of Uganda Manufacturers’ Association
was interviewed. He stated that free-market trade policies should only be between countries of
equal economic scale to avoid a huge export deficit due to disproportionately exporting basic
goods while importing final products. Also, industry protectionism is viewed as important to
their interests as manufacturers cannot compete on the global market yet and need time to catch
up to global standards. UMA believes that to support its commercial/industrial development and
entrance into a middle-income economy, the cost of doing business and cost of production must
improve, which requires a hands-on government. Ultimately, UMA advocates for specific
nascent industries being protected. Furthermore, to ensure economic development is inclusive
and therefore human development is achieved, UMA believes that people is rural areas need to
be empowered as most of the population lives in those areas. This would be done through
government increasing salaries in those areas to spark industries to move there while also
building credit facilities and investing in technology (Uganda Manufacturers’ Association).
Uganda’s exporters are represented by the Uganda Export Promotion Board. An interview
conducted with an analyst revealed that exporters were hurt by Uganda’s liberalization policies
due to foreign competition. Instead, UEPB supports some level of government control in which
they regulate prices, help with import distribution to ensure equitability and targeted incentives
for value-addition industries as Uganda needs to transition away from raw materials towards
final goods to reduce their export deficit (Uganda Export Promotion Board).
The only agreement of neoliberal trade policies came from the private sector who was
represented by a policy and trade officer from Private Sector Foundation Uganda. The officer
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stated that liberalization was inevitable and therefore they advocated for liberalization with
policies put in place to help people better position themselves for increased competition. This
entails focusing on reducing costs of production through infrastructure development and access
to credit as well as opening up the market gradually. Although the officer admits that smaller
private firms have been hurt by liberalization, they attribute this to inferior export promotion
policies that don’t incentivize firms with free-market policies. Ultimately, PSFU believes that
wealth can only be created in a competitive business environment. Furthermore, they believe the
inequality from neoliberal policies can be offset through growing the agricultural sector as that is
where most of the population lies. However, the population will double in 25 years and land will
not so this is not a sustainable model. Instead, the agricultural sector will either become too
diluted or too concentrated in the hands of a few elites (Private Sector Foundation Uganda).
According to an officer in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives, whose department
handles all trade policy decisions, the current neoliberal position has been harmful to Uganda as
the trade deficit increases and it is unclear if the average level of income has increased or
decreased. It has led to inefficiency and environmental destruction. Instead, government needs
to monitor industries and place resources accordingly. Even within the ministry that handles
trade policy creation and implementation there are conflicting views as many feel that Uganda’s
current neoliberal policies haven’t worked as intended (Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Cooperatives).
Overall, it is clear both from historical examples and from the viewpoints of key stakeholders,
including government officials, that developmental state policies have a lot of potential to grow
the economy in a controlled and inclusive manner while the neoliberal trade policies have failed
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to encourage human development and inclusive economic development. Therefore, on the
global trade level, Uganda should employ developmental state policies.
6.2

The Case for Free Market Policies in Regional Trade

While developmental state-based policies in global trade is beneficial for LDCs, regionally the
trade position employed should be one based on free-market values. To understand why, the
current example of the Tripartite Free Trade Area will be examined:
The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) is a proposed African free trade agreement between the
regional economic communities (RECs) of COMESA, SADC, and EAC, declared on 12 June
2011. The proposed area will stretch from Cape Town to Cairo, creating an integrated market
with a total GDP of about US$1trillion and a population of more than 600 million people. The
agreement will come into force once ratified by the parliaments of two-thirds of the 26 member
states and will be achieved through the harmonization of policies and programs across the three
RECs (SADC, 2015).
The objective of the proposed agreement is to accelerate African economic integration and
achieve sustainable economic development that will alleviate poverty and improve the quality of
life for people in the region. Between 2004 and 2014, trade within COMESA grew from
US$8bn to US$22bn, within SADC it rose from US$20bn to US$72bn and within SADC it grew
from US$2.6bn to US$8.6bn. Overall, trade between the three areas rose from $30.6bn to
US$102.6bn. The proposed agreement, on paper, would seek to take advantage of this growth
(where the continent has seen an average growth rate of 5% during the last few years) and
accelerate it (Juma).
The Tripartite Free Trade Agreement has three core pillars: market integration, infrastructure
development and industrial development. Under market integration, economic growth will be
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achieved through the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. Under infrastructure
development, enhanced connectivity and lower costs of doing business will be attained. The
issue of productive capacity constraints will be addressed under the pillar of industrial
development (SADC, 2016).
Trade within Africa is still relatively low, hovering around 10-12% in comparison to intraEuropean trade, which is 70%. Under the TFTA, trade within Africa would increase to 30%
(BBC, 2015). The TFTA will create a much larger market whose free trade status will maintain
steady economic growth of 6-7% annually, projecting Africa to reach a GDP of US$29trillion by
2050. This growth will contribute to poverty reduction and increased prosperity. The prospect
of a larger market will also stimulate industrial development, creating new industries and jobs as
well as diversifying Africa’s economy away from raw materials. Not only will the TFTA spur
industrial development but will also incentivize cross-border infrastructure development to
support its industrial development (Juma).
The TFTA will allow members to achieve economies of scale, eventually allowing them to
compete globally. This also results in an overall positive welfare effect on the region of at least
US$3.3bn per year if all tariff and non-tariff barriers are eliminated. The effect is very unequally
distributed with 72% of the welfare gains going to South Africa alone; however, only Kenya and
Zimbabwe have negative welfare gains as a result (Mold).
Lastly, the TFTA lays the groundwork for the African Union’s Continental Free Trade Area
plan, in which the whole continent will be a free trade zone. By merging the three RECs into the
African Economic Community, inconsistencies and costs of overlapping REC memberships are
resolved (Ngwenya). Furthermore, consumers in Africa will gain access to cheaper and better
quality products as a result of African economic integration.
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However, there are a few challenges ahead:
Political Will
There are many challenges to realizing the TFTA. The most pertinent challenge is that many
countries don’t want to commit to the agreement due to the fear of negative impact on their
economies. There are no mechanisms for helping the losers of the agreement, and thus
convincing countries to sign the agreement is difficult. Many of the countries have small
economies and produce few exportable goods. The TFTA would mean they’d have to compete
with larger economies that could hurt their industries. Specifically, many are concerned that,
under the TFTA, industrial production would concentrate in Egypt and South Africa, who have
the highest productivity levels. However, simulation results suggest this will not be the case as
total volume of industrial output will only increase modestly with more growth in industrial
output in smaller economies (Mold). Africa has had similar development plans in the past such
as OAU, NEPAD and Lagos Plan of Action only to become white elephant projects (Mubangizi).
To realize the TFTA requires political will, commitment and stability.

Non-tariff Barriers
The TFTA agreement provides a mechanism for harmonizing COMESA, EAC and SADC NTB
arrangements through a process of identifying, categorizing, reporting, monitoring and resolving
NTBs. Eliminating NTBs is vital as complete tariff liberalization for intra-TFTA trade with the
elimination of NTBs projects an aggregate net benefit for the region of US$3.3bn per year. This
is more than five times the gains resulting from full intra-TFTA tariff liberalization alone
(David).
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Tariff Revenue
Customs duties are a major source of government revenue in the region. The governments of
countries such as Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique, DRC, Uganda, Zambia, Swaziland, Tanzania
and Namibia collect up to half of their revenue from customs duties. Thus, the TFTA may signal
huge loss of revenue for governments involved. However, it is important to note that most tariff
revenue comes from imports from the EU and East Asia, which would be unaffected by the
TFTA. Furthermore, the cost of the removal of tariffs would be relatively modest due to revenue
gained from increased trade and industrialization (Mold).

Movement of People
The fear of increased unemployment and amplified socio-cultural conflict, has led to the free
movement of people being questioned (Kapkirwok). While, perhaps the complete free
movement of people within the TFTA is not realistic currently, the free movement of goods and
services cannot exist without the free movement of people. Thus, it is important that the free
movement of business persons be negotiated to facilitate trade in the area.

Product Diversification
Most African countries export raw materials and basic commodities outside the continent while
importing manufactured goods and finished products from outside. The result is that the
continent has a huge trade deficit, mostly stemming from trade with the EU and US. Thus, it is
important to emphasize the diversification of goods and services and adding value through
industrial development and investment in infrastructure. Through regional integration, countries
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in the TFTA will be able to industrialize, attain economies of scale, and compete on the global
markets (Zamfir).

Implementation
As is usually the case, implementation could prove to be the biggest challenge to the TFTA.
Already behind schedule, governments could continue to drag their feet on implementing the
agreement or fail to remove trade barriers. Ultimately, solving this problem requires political
will and good governance. However, it also involves exploring new areas such as infrastructure,
intellectual capital and agriculture.
Poor infrastructure, high transaction costs and low levels of industrialization have left African
intra-trade low. Average transport costs in Africa are twice the world average and are thought to
harm trade more than tariffs. Thus, for the TFTA to be implemented to its full potential,
connectivity and linkages among member states must be improved. This comes from investment
in transport infrastructure, energy and information and communication technology infrastructure
(ICT). Through ICT investment e-learning, e-commerce, and e-governance are enabled and
connectivity is increased.
Many countries lack a skilled workforce. Countries like this, such as Rwanda have benefitted
from highly trained personnel within the region. Others, however, protect their few jobs instead
of opening up to boost their economy. If visa restrictions were not an obstacle, the region would
be an intellectual hub due to its numerous universities. To maximize use of intellectual capital,
educational policies in the region must be harmonized and free movement be given to students
and teachers.
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Agriculture is Africa’s most neglected sector although it employs 70% of the continent. The
region has fertile soils and good climate, yet food security remains weak. To maximize the
benefits of the TFTA, African governments need to give sufficient funding for agricultural
innovation to improve food security and increase food surplus for exports. Output must increase
to avoid a situation where demand increases and supply stays limited, leading to food insecurity
as producers flock to more lucrative regional markets.
The eventual goal of the TFTA is 100% liberalization of tariff lines. However, upon entry into
the TFTA, only 60-85% of tariff lines need to be liberalized with the remaining lines being
liberalized over five to eight years. This is a big disadvantage for Uganda who has already
liberalized more than others thus increasing competition in their domestic markets while getting
unequal market access in return. Furthermore, Uganda doesn’t stand a chance in the
manufactured goods market due to high costs related to electricity costs and unsteady supply.
Instead, Uganda’s competitive advantage lies in exporting low value-addition agricultural based
raw materials. Thus, on the surface level it may appear as though the TFTA doesn’t benefit
Uganda. However, Uganda has the perfect opportunity to utilize its geographical position as a
trade center between the SADC countries as a safer transit point to final destinations like South
Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. Under the TFTA, Uganda will benefit immensely in terms
of achieving inclusive economic growth (Mubangizi). To achieve this, the issues above must be
addressed.

6.3

Capacity Building

As the next WTO Ministerial Conference approaches, it should be the priorities of LDCs such as
Uganda to increase their trade and negotiations capacity. This paper looks at the WTO 2016

27

Public Forum to analyze what the key priorities of LDCs should be to build their capacities in
reaction to the agenda set by the economic powers in the WTO:
The fifteenth annual Public Forum of the World Trade Organization was held in Geneva,
Switzerland between 27 to 29 September, 2016. It provided a platform for academics, civil
society members, the media, non-governmental organizations and leading global businesspeople
to come together with representatives of governments and inter-governmental organizations to
discuss some of the major trade and development issues of the day. The theme of this year’s
forum was “inclusive trade”. The forum emphasized three sub-themes:
•

Expanding the capacity of Small-and-Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to participate in
international trade as innovation has been driving SMEs’ expansion into the global
market

•

The importance of new digital technologies on trade was highlighted. Trade is a driver of
innovation and new technologies has transformed the way the world trades. Thus, the
forum focused on how trade can foster innovation and how trade needs to adapt to keepup with rapidly changing technology. This brought up questions such as:
o

“Whether the WTO needs to reform trade rules to allow members to fully benefit
from innovation?”

o “If technological innovation is a driver of development?”
o “How can innovation enhance the trading capacities of developing countries?”
•

How best to include marginalized groups, such as women, in international trade

This forum, in the view of the developing countries, completely ignored the Doha Development
Agenda issues, which are yet to be resolved. This section examines the stance of Least

28

Developed Countries (LDCs) in response to the Public Forum and where they should focus their
efforts to expand their capacities (World Trade Organization).
Doha Development Agenda
During the Bali 9th WTO Ministerial Conference, WTO members agreed to develop a work
program to resolve the Doha Development Agenda, which has yet to come to an agreement after
decade long negotiations. In the 2016 Public Forum, African nations accused the developed
countries of shifting focus away from remaining issues of the Doha Round. This resistance
forced a deferment on e-commerce/digital trade negotiations, guided by the Nairobi MC10 in
which “ministers agreed to prioritize work on the outstanding Doha issues, such as Agriculture
Trade Distorting Domestic Support, SSM (Special Safeguard Mechanism), Public Stockholding
for Food Security, Cotton, LDC (least-developed countries) priorities, TRIPS (Trade-Related
Intellectual Properties) and last but not least Development and S&DT (special and differential
treatment)”.
However, this resistance is being challenged by the US and its partners who want e-commerce to
be a central theme of the 11th Ministerial Conference. It’s important to note that there needs to
be a thematic consensus at the WTO for each conference.
The LDCs’ response should be to oppose the opening of any new issues before the conclusion of
the Doha Agenda issues under the agreement made at the Nairobi MC10 and the 1998 work
program on e-commerce, which states that no negotiations can be held on e-commerce that isn’t
based on the existing mandate set.

E-Commerce Liberalization
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The US and its partners want to liberalize e-commerce through prohibiting digital customs
duties, enabling cross-border data flows, promoting a free and open Internet, preventing
localization barriers, barring forced technology transfers, protecting critical source code.
Clearly, these steps towards liberalization would be at the expense of LDCs who lack the
infrastructure to reap any of the benefits while their domestic markets would be open up to
further competition and their national sovereignty undermined. The issue of LDCs is not that
they lack market access but that they can’t compete in the market against the subsidized goods of
the US/EU due to poor infrastructure and unfair trade deals.
The US and its partners argue that e-commerce liberalization will benefit developing countries
through expanding opportunities and furthering inclusivity in the global value chain for their
SMEs. However, a World Bank study recently stated that "although there are many individual
success stories, the effect of technology on (…) expansion of opportunity for the poor and the
middle class (…) has so far been less than expected". The Global North also argues that ecommerce liberalization opens up innovative solutions to developing countries through sharing
of technology. However, due to the TRIPS agreement, these technologies would have to be
imported at high-costs to the benefit of the exporting developed countries with no real benefit to
the importing LDC, as seen through the World Bank study. As such, LDCs should not support
the liberalization of e-commerce as the benefits are marginal in comparison to the costs of
exploitation.

Trade Facilitation Agreement
During the Bali Ministerial Conference, WTO members concluded negotiations on a Trade
Facilitation Agreement that would expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods as
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well as set out measures for effective cooperation between customs and other appropriate
authorities on trade facilitation and customs compliance issues. The Agreement will go into
effect once 2/3rds of members have domestically ratified it. Currently, of the 19 COMESA
countries, six have signed, not including Uganda. While the agreement looks good on paper,
LDCs should not sign it. Africa’s share of global trade is around only 2%. This agreement
would make it easier for imports to enter Africa without much benefits to exports due to its small
scale. The net result would be a further export deficit for LDCs. Therefore, LDCs such as
Uganda should not sign the Agreement.

Agriculture and Food Security
Around 75% of the population in developing countries live in rural areas and the majority rely on
agriculture for their livelihood. Under the Doha Development Agenda, relating specifically to
agriculture, services and manufacturing, the World Bank predicts that global income could
increase by $3000bn/year with $2500bn going to developing economies. Therefore, it is
important that issues discussed from Doha be implemented in the global trading system such as:
•

Promoting export competition through removal of agricultural domestic trade distorting
support (eg: US/EU agricultural export subsidies)

•

Improving market access by designating and protecting Special Products that have an
impact on food security, livelihood security and rural development

•

Implementation of public stockholding for food security

•

Implementation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for LDCs (especially to address the
challenges of import surges)

•

Further improvement to Special and Differential Treatment
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Regional Integration
Regional integration is a key priority for LDCs such as Uganda. It offers new opportunities to
develop SME exports and create new value chains. Currently, the cost of moving a container to
an African neighboring country is higher than moving it to New York. Unless Africa improves
upon regional integration, its trade competitiveness will continue to suffer.
Recent East African integration through the East African Community (EAC) has resulted in large
trade increase as well as improvements in welfare and stability, according to research. This is
due to improvements in cross-border flows of finance, goods trade, free movement of persons,
regional value chains and cross-border infrastructure.
However, there are issues around Regional Free Trade Agreements. The COMESA countries
export many mutual products. As such, they place tariffs on these “Sensitive Products”, which
are most goods they export, to protect their domestic markets. Furthermore, the free movement
of labor causes tension among populations. This being said, it is important for LDCs to integrate
regionally to grow their economies and improve their capacities.

Productive Capacity Building
For LDCs to build their productive capacities requires investment in “infrastructure, finance,
energy, skills, laws and regulations”. This includes incentivizing the fundamental enablers or
financial institutions to fund SMEs as a lack of financing is a major barrier to the economic
prosperity of LDCs.
Rather than utilizing e-commerce liberalization to expand capacity through technological
development and market access, sustainable investment practices can improve physical
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infrastructure, advance innovation capacity and develop technology to build the capacity of
LDCs while working towards the Sustainable Development Goals.
In conclusion, the priorities of the LDCs, as the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference approaches,
should be focused around the unresolved issues of the Doha Development Agenda, e-commerce
liberalization, the Trade Facilitation Agreement, protecting agriculture and food security,
regional integration, and productive capacity building in order to expand their negotiations and
trade capacities given the current state of the WTO. These issues must be at the center of
negotiations at the next Ministerial Conference rather than thematic approaches like e-commerce,
which is to the clear benefit of SMEs and corporations of developed countries (World Trade
Organization).

7.0

Conclusion and Suggestions

Uganda is approaching 2020 rapidly and if the country wants to achieve its mission of middleincome status (that is also inclusive to the interests of civil society as a whole), its trade position
will have to be solid. Ultimately, based on the findings of this paper there is a clear answer as to
what trade position would be most beneficial to Uganda’s national development in the context of
human development as well as economic development.
In global trade Uganda needs to move away from neoliberal trade policies that have allowed
developed countries to exploit their markets without receiving the benefits of reciprocation due
to their weak trade capacity. The result of Uganda’s neoliberal policies in trade have been a
huge trade deficit and massive wealth inequality. Instead, Uganda needs to employ strategies
similar to Singapore, where the state has a role in shaping macro-economics. Uganda needs to
allow Foreign Direct Investment to thrive while implementing policies that prevent capital
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repatriation. Furthermore, while they need to open up their markets to competition they also
need to protect nascent industries where they may have a potential comparative advantage later
on. To achieve this requires that the government is kept lean, honest and efficient through
enforcing tough laws on corruption, downsizing the civil service, and a halt on the creation of
more districts. The result will be that Uganda will have rapidly grown its GDP while improving
education and healthcare (which are necessary infrastructural improvements needed to continue
economic growth), as Singapore has done.
In the context of regional trade Uganda should actually promote neoliberal trade policies and
regional integration. By having free trade agreements between economies of similar size
investment, competitiveness, innovation, infrastructure and wealth will increase in the region
without some countries being exploited by others. Although there are a few larger economies
such as Egypt and South Africa that could threaten this fact, the simulations show that this is
unlikely due to productivity constraints. To achieve regional integration, the best possibility
would be the conclusion of the Tripartite Free Trade Area agreement, which would put 26
African states under one economic umbrella. However, there are a number of issues to resolve
before this can be implemented; the biggest issue being political will or lack thereof. Ultimately,
political willingness can only come from an understanding that all countries will benefit from
this agreement and an acceptance that some will benefit more than others.
Neither trade positions matter, however, if Uganda fails to build its trade and negotiations
capacity. This can be achieved, first, by opposing the agenda proposed by the developed
countries for the next Ministerial Conference, which shifts focus away from the unfinished work
of the Doha Development Agenda. Instead, LDCs need to push to resolve outstanding Doha
issues, such as agriculture trade distorting domestic support, SSM (Special Safeguard
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Mechanism), public stockholding for food security, cotton, TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual
Properties) and S&DT (special and differential treatment). They also need to oppose further
trade liberalization between the global north and global south until they can be competitive.
Lastly, LDCs need to increase their productive capacity so that they can be competitive in global
markets. The issue LDCs face in global trade isn’t a lack of market access but a lack of ability to
compete.
The narrative that “Africa is rising” stands true with countries in the COMESA and East African
region with average GDP growth rates of 5%. However, for these countries such as Uganda to
fulfill its potential will require strong economic policies, building infrastructure, good
governance, and proper policy implementation and enforcement.
The future looks bright on Africa’s horizon.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Form

PARTICIPANT INFORMED CONSENT FORM
INDEPENDENT STUDY PROJECT TOPIC:
STUDENT NAME:
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this project.
My name is Prahlad Krishnan. I am a student with SIT Study Abroad Uganda Development
Studies program. I would like to invite you to participate in a study I am conducting. However,
before you agree to participate in this study, it is important you know enough about it to make
an informed decision. If you have any questions, at any time, please ask me. You should be
satisfied with the answers before you agree to be in the study.
Brief description of the purpose of this study
The purpose of this study is to examine how Uganda’s trade policy has and should be formed to
rapidly develop its economy and develop in the context of human development.
Your participation will consist of ___________________________________ and will require
approximately ______________________of your time.
There are ____ foreseeable risks in participating in this study and no penalties should you
choose not to participate; participation is voluntary. During the interview you have the right to
not answer any questions or discontinue participation at any time.
Rights Notice
In an endeavor to uphold the ethical standards of all SIT ISP proposals, this study has been
reviewed and approved by a Local Review Board or SIT Institutional Review Board. If at any
time, you feel that you are at risk or exposed to unreasonable harm, you may terminate and
stop participation. Please take some time to carefully read the statements provided below.
a. Privacy - all information you present in this interview may be recorded and
safeguarded. If you do not want the information recorded, you need to let the
interviewer know.
b. Confidentiality - all confidential information will be protected.
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c. Withdraw – you are free to withdraw your participation in the project at any time
and may refuse to respond to any part of the research. Participants who desire to
withdraw shall be allowed to do so promptly and without prejudice to their interests
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant, you may visit the World Learning
website and check its policies on Human Subjects Research at www.sit.edu or contact the
Academic Director at ______________.
If you have any questions or want to get more information about this study, please contact me
at phone: ________ or email at: _________.
Please sign below if you agree to participate in this research study and acknowledge that you
are 18 years of age or older.

Participants signature

Date

Researcher’s signature

Date
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Appendix B: Interview questions
Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry
1. What does UNCCI membership mostly comprise of? Manufacturing, services or
agriculture?
2. What is UNCCI’s trade position?
3. What will be the effect of this trade position on Uganda’s private sector? How about on
agriculture? How about on manufacturing and exports? How about on services?
(looking at case for protectionism)
4. How does UNCCI balance the interests of agriculture against industry?
5. How does UNCCI formulate its trade position?
6. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial
development and entrance into its middle-income phase?
7. How does UNCCI advocate or lobby for these policies?
8. What is the effect of Uganda’s current trade position on commercial/industrial
development and economic development?
9. What are the challenges of pushing UNCCI’s trade position to the government?
10. What are the challenges of policy implementation?
11. What policy does UNCCI advocate for in terms of East African regional trade? How
does it differ from global trade?
12. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial
development-wise)?
13. Do you have examples of other countries that Uganda should follow?
14. How can Uganda increase its trade and negotiation capacity?
15. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole
population is raised up and not just the elite)?
16. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies?
17. What is UNCCI’s ultimate goal?
18. Any other comments?
Ministry of East African Community Affairs
1. What is Uganda’s current regional trade position and why?
2. How will East African regional integration benefit Uganda’s development?
3. What are the effects/results of this trade position on economic development and human
development (eg: poverty alleviation)?
4. How does this trade position contribute towards Uganda’s growth to middle-income
status?
5. How has this trade position affected the average Ugandan and are they getting the
financial benefits as well?
6. How does Uganda formulate its regional trade position? What is the process?
7. What are some recent examples of trade policy achievements and why?
8. What are the challenges of policy implementation?
9. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial
development and entrance into its middle-income phase?
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10. What indicators do you use to test the effectiveness of trade policy?
11. How can Uganda expand its negotiation capacity in the region?
12. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial
development-wise)?
13. Can you talk a bit about EAC’s tripartite deal?
14. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity?
15. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole
population is raised up and not just the elite)?
16. What do you see as the future of Ugandan regional trade and its policies? How can this
be accomplished?
17. Any other comments?
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
1. What is Uganda’s current global trade position and why?
2. What are the effects/results of this trade position on economic development and human
development (eg: poverty alleviation)?
3. How does this trade position contribute towards Uganda’s growth to middle-income
status?
4. How has this trade position affected the average Ugandan and are they getting the
financial benefits as well?
5. How does Uganda formulate its trade position? What is the process?
6. What are some recent examples of trade policy achievements and why?
7. What are the challenges of policy implementation?
8. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial
development and entrance into its middle-income phase?
9. What indicators do you use to test the effectiveness of trade policy?
10. How is effectiveness measured?
11. What are the repercussions/costs of acting against Western interests in terms of Global
Trade policies? How have they responded in the past?
12. How does Uganda go about negotiating with developed economic powers?
13. How can Uganda expand its negotiation capacity?
14. What policy does Uganda advocate for in terms of East African regional trade? How
does it differ from global trade?
15. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial
development-wise)?
16. Do you have examples of other countries that Uganda should follow?
17. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity?
18. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole
population is raised up and not just the elite)?
19. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies?
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Uganda Export Promotion Board
1.
2.
3.
4.

What is UEPB’s trade position?
What will be the effect of this trade position on Uganda’s export development?
What indicators do you use to test the effectiveness of trade policy?
What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its export development and
entrance into its middle-income phase?
5. How does Uganda’s current trade position affect Uganda’s export development?
6. What are the challenges of pushing UEPB’s trade position to the government?
7. What are the challenges of policy implementation?
8. What policy does UEPB advocate for in terms of East African regional trade? How does
it differ from global trade?
9. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved?
10. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity?
11. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole
population is raised up and not just the elite)?
12. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies?
13. What is UEPB’s ultimate goal?
14. Anything else?

Private Sector Foundation Uganda
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What does PSF’s membership mostly comprise of? Manufacturing or services?
What is PSF’s trade position?
What will be the effect of this trade position on Uganda’s private sector?
How does PSF formulate its trade position?
What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial
development and entrance into its middle-income phase?
6. How does PSF advocate or lobby for these policies?
7. How does Uganda’s current trade position affect Uganda’s private sector?
8. What is the effect of Uganda’s current trade position on commercial/industrial
development and economic development?
9. What are the challenges of pushing PSF’s trade position to the government?
10. What are the challenges of policy implementation?
11. What policy does PSF advocate for in terms of East African regional trade? How does it
differ from global trade?
12. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial
development-wise)?
13. Do you have examples of other countries that Uganda should follow?
14. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity?
15. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole
population is raised up and not just the elite)?
16. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies?
17. What is PSF’s ultimate goal?
18. How do you balance interests of agriculture and manufacturing?
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19. Last comments?
Uganda Manufacturers’ Association (UMA)
1. What is UMA’s trade position?
2. What will be the effect of this trade position on Uganda’s manufacturers?
3. What should Uganda’s key trade priorities be to support its commercial/industrial
development and entrance into its middle-income phase?
4. How does Uganda’s current trade position affect Uganda’s manufacturers?
5. What is the effect of Uganda’s current trade position on commercial/industrial
development and economic development?
6. What are the challenges of pushing UMA’s trade position to the government?
7. What are the challenges of policy implementation?
8. What policy does UMA advocate for in terms of East African regional trade? How does
it differ from global trade?
9. How do you see East African regional integration being achieved and why is having a
regional free trade agreement beneficial (both economically and commercial/industrial
development-wise)?
10. How can Uganda increase its trade capacity?
11. How can Uganda transition to a true middle-income economy (where the whole
population is raised up and not just the elite)?
12. What do you see as the future of Ugandan trade and its policies?
13. What is UMA’s ultimate goal?
14. Any other comments?
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